Even after high-profile failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, some policymakers continue to call for ousting odious regimes with military force. They claim that the approach is cheaper and faster than sustained diplomatic pressure and engagement, that it won’t escalate into wider military action, and that it will produce real benefits at relatively low cost. But the evidence shows that these claims are largely false. As Downes writes, regime change has a tendency to go awry, generating unintended consequences that often far outweigh any initial benefits.
The main problem is that toppling an existing regime usually creates winners and losers, who are willing to put up armed resistance to regain their former positions. The result is usually chaos that may turn into a civil war or state collapse. That’s why a successful regime-change operation needs serious planning, broad multilateral support, and a population in the target country ready to embrace change. It also needs a credible alternative ready to step in once the old government is gone. In Venezuela’s case, that person is Juan Guaido, who claims to be the country’s legitimate president and is recognized by an increasing number of countries.
The fact is, however, that the United States and its allies lack strong political institutions in most of the countries they want to democratize or make stable, including Venezuela, North Korea, and Iran. Moreover, they are often engaged in nation-building projects that impose costs and risks on their own populations. In the long run, this breeds distrust of U.S. intentions and hamstrings future policy goals.
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